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THE AFTERMATH OF A HIJACKING-
PASSENGER CLAIMS AND INSURANCE
GEORGE N. TOMPKINS, JR.*
In this speech given at the Air Law Symposium on March 22,
1973, Mr. George N. Tompkins, Jr. presents an overview of in-
surance-related problems that arise from airplane hijackings. Mr.
Tompkins examines the legal aspects of recovery by passengers for
injuries, both physical and mental, that are caused by hijackings.
He explains that the applicable rules governing this recovery will
depend on whether the passenger was traveling within one country,
between countries, or between the United States and some other
country. Mr. Tompkins also discusses the development of aviation
war risk insurance and whether it, or all risk insurance, provides
coverage for losses arising from hijackings.
H IJACKINGS of commercial aircraft have, unfortunately, be-
come quite commonplace. As could be expected, this fact
has generated some interesting and complex legal issues, some of
which have not yet been resolved. This is exemplified by an article
concerning the Pan American 747 destroyed at Cairo on Septem-
ber 6, 1970, which stated:
Hijacking as a deliberate political act has become a fact of life.
And the problem of insuring aircraft-who should pay what to
whom-has become a major question likely to keep battalions of
lawyers busy for years.'
While these legal issues are not yet keeping battalions of lawyers
busy, several squads are presently heavily engaged in litigating
them.
Two of these problems, although somewhat diverse in nature,
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are the subject matter of this article. The first is the subject of
passenger claims for personal injury, death, or delay that arise
as a result of a hijacking. The second concerns the subject of in-
surance. How can an airline insure itself against the risks inherent
in any hijacking; risks to passengers and risks to the aircraft? And
what problems arise in determining which insurance policy covers
the inherent risks of a particular hijacking?
The problems of the infant airline industry fifty years ago con-
trast greatly with one of the most serious problems facing the
airline industry today, that of hijacking. When airlines were first
being formed fifty years ago, flying was a fairly simple, if somewhat
unpredictable, business. The pioneer aviators dusted off their bi-
planes and carried their intrepid passengers for short daylight hops
whenever the weather permitted. No one gave a thought to such
matters as aerial piracy or how to insure against it. The situation
has certainly changed.'
The nature of hijacking itself also has changed. Initially, hijack-
ing was represented by the side trip to Cuba, and was joked about
by passengers, government and industry members alike. No one
today considers hijacking a matter to be treated lightly. The polit-
ical terrorists have appeared on the scene, and the ransom seekers
are a recent innovation. Civil aviation has become a prime target
of those who seek to draw world attention to their cause. Passengers
and airlines alike have become the innocent victims of this terrorist
activity.
Political or terrorist hijackings had their grandest moment on
the Labor Day weekend of 1970, when no less than five jet air-
craft, including a 747, were hijacked on the same day.3 Only one
of the hijackings was thwarted-that involved an El Al Israel Air-
lines aircraft on which the hijackers were subdued and the aircraft
made a forced landing at London's Heathrow Airport. Three of
the aircraft, those of BOAC, TWA, and Swissair, were diverted
to a desert landing strip in Jordan where they were subsequently
destroyed by the hijackers and their compatriots." The fifth, a
Pan American 747, was ultimately diverted to Cairo where it too
was destroyed within minutes after landing. Members of the Pop-
2ld.
I N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4; Id. Sept. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
4
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ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took credit for all five
hijackings.5
The legal problems which have developed from this particular
day and these hijackings are representative ones, and as such,
Labor Day weekend of 1970 provides an easy reference point for
a discussion of the legal aspects of air piracy, both in the realm
of passenger claims and insurance coverage. Several passenger
claims against TWA, Pan American, and Swissair are pending in
the state and federal courts of New York.' The question of who
should pay for the loss of the Pan American 747 has been tried
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, and a decision has just recently been rendered.'
This article makes no attempt at resolution of the legal problems
which have arisen from hijackings. The purpose is simply to deli-
neate these problems and to outline the legal principles that are,
or probably will be, applied in resolving them.
I. PASSENGER CLAIMS
Because aviation is inherently international in nature, two sep-
arate systems of liability rules have developed in the United States
for resolving passenger claims for injury, death, or delay in any
aviation case, including a hijacking case. The basis for determining
the applicability of one system as opposed to the other is the nature
of the transportation of the particular passenger involved. This
derives from the complete routing of his journey as evidenced by
his passenger ticket. The distinction sometimes is referred to as
domestic versus international transportation, but it is preferable
to categorize the two different systems as international and non-
international.
5Id.
'Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), appeal docketed, No. 73-1501, 2d Cir., March 5, 1973; Raful v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 41 App. Div.2d 753, 341 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dept. 1973);
Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827
(2d Dept. 1972); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 963,
338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dept. 1972); Salmon v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., Index No. 096917, Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, March 16, 1971.
'Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 71
Civ. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Since this talk was given, the non-jury trial has con-
cluded and a decision has been rendered. The court, in a lengthy opinion, has
held that the Pan American loss falls within the all risk policy. 71 Civ. 1118
(filed Sept. 17, 1973). The author understands that this decision will be appealed.
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The international system of liability rules is set forth in a treaty
of the United States known as the Warsaw Convention.! The non-
international system of liability rules as applied in this country is
simply the common law rules of negligence.' The liability rules of
the Warsaw Convention "apply to all international transportation
of persons, baggage or goods performed by aircraft for hire.""
"International transportation" is defined in Article 1(2) of the
Warsaw Convention as any transportation in which the places of
departure and destination are situated either within the territory
of two parties to the Convention, or within the territory of one
party provided that there is an agreed stopping place in the terri-
tory of another country, even though the other country is not a
party to the Convention." The places of departure and destination,
and agreed stopping places, are determined by reference to the
contract of carriage which, in the transportation of passengers, is
generally the passenger ticket."
If the particular passenger ticket provides for "international
transportation" as defined in Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention,
then the liability rules applicable to any passenger claim for per-
sonal injury, death, or delay are exclusively those set forth in the
Convention."3 If the particular transportation is not international
as defined in the Warsaw Convention, then the liability rules which
will be applied generally in the United States are the common
8 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000 et seq., T.S. 876 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
'See Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972); American
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969); See generally Fed-
eral Insurance Co. v. Colon, 392 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1968); Cox v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967); Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874
(3d Cir. 1966); Orr v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 332 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1964);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
"Warsaw Convention, article 1(I).
1 Warsaw Convention, article 1(2).
'1 Molitch v. Irish International Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970); Eck
v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966); Mertens v. Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965);
Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 227
F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956). See also Block v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 905 (1968).
's See cases cited note 12 supra.
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law rules of negligence applicable to the passenger-carrier relation-
ship.
14
Although it was originally intended that all signatories to the
Warsaw Convention would, by legislative enactment, render the
liability rules of the Convention applicable to non-international
transportation as well, the United States has not done so. In the
United States, therefore, we must deal with two distinct systems
of liability rules in passenger aviation cases, dependent upon the
nature of the transportation as evidenced by the individual pas-
senger ticket.
The result has been confusion and misunderstanding in many
instances. For example, two men travelling side by side on the
same aircraft operating as a shuttle service between Dallas and
Houston could be subject to different sets of passenger-carrier
liability rules. One passenger ticket may read Dallas/Houston/
Dallas. This is non-international transportation and the liability
rules applicable presumably would be the law of Texas dealing
with the passenger-carrier relationship. The other passenger ticket
may read Dallas/Houston/Mexico City/Houston/Dallas. This is
international transportation as defined in the Warsaw Convention
and the liability rules of the Convention would be applicable even
with respect to the shuttle service between Dallas and Houston.
At the risk of belaboring this point, this legal distinction between
international and non-international transportation must be empha-
sized because the international liability rules are quite different
from the non-international rules.1" The most important thing to
remember is that in order to determine the applicability of one
system as opposed to the other, the controlling factor is the in-
dividual passenger ticket pursuant to which the person making
the claim was travelling when the claim arose. The key to the
applicability of one system or the other is simply the passenger
ticket. The nature of the particular flight, the nationality of the
passenger, the nationality of the airline, whether the aircraft is
travelling between different nations or wholly within one nation,
are all irrelevant in determining whether the liability rules appli-
cable are the international or the non-international rules.
14 See cases cited note 9 supra.
" See text adjacent to note 22 inlra.
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A. The Non-International Liability Rules
In cases of non-international transportation the liability rules
that are applied by the courts in the United States are the common
law rules of negligence, and generally an airline, as a common
carrier, owes the highest degree of care to its passengers in the
conduct of its flight operations."6
The hijackings which have taken place in this hemisphere have
not led to a significant amount of litigation by passengers involving
injuries, death, or delay. In applying the common law rules of
negligence, the basic questions would be whether the airline was
negligent in permitting the hijacking to occur and whether the
damage complained of was proximately caused by the hijacking.
As a result of recently enacted federal regulations, airlines and
airports are now required to adopt and follow certain minimal
security procedures designed to prevent hijackings. These include
visual inspection of carry-on baggage items and clearance of each
passenger either by a detection device or a personal search.' Ob-
viously, if an airline neither adopts such procedures nor follows
the required procedures in a particular incident and a hijacking
results, the airline will be held liable for the foreseeable conse-
quences of the hijacking.
Problems may arise, however, in determining just what are the
foreseeable consequences of a hijacking. For example, can it rea-
sonably be said that the deliberate or accidental shooting of a
passenger by a hijacker or a security guard was proximately caused
by, or is a foreseeable consequence of, the hijacking? Similarly
can it reasonably be said that the destruction of an aircraft by
explosive devices resulting in death or injury of passengers was
proximately caused by, or is a foreseeable consequence of, the
hijacking?
The lines of proximate causation and foreseeability in these
areas have not yet been drawn by the courts. Fortunately, a major
disaster involving serious injury or death of passengers has not
yet resulted during the course of a hijacking of a commercial air-
craft in the United States. The courts, therefore, have not yet de-
cided the extent to which an airline will be liable for the injury or
death of passengers sustained during the course of a hijacking.
16 See cases cited note 9 supra.
" 14 C.F.R. §§ 107,121 (1973).
AFTERMATH OF A HIJACKING
This determination in all probability will depend upon the appli-
cation of traditional negligence rules, and the concepts of proximate
cause and foreseeability. 0
A passenger may, however, sustain injury or death during the
course of a hijacking, not as a proximate or foreseeable result of
the hijacking, but as a result of one of the normally recognized
risks of the air. For example, turbulence may cause injury to a
passenger. A passenger may fall on the aircraft, sustain food poi-
soning, fall getting off the aircraft, or the aircraft itself may crash
in the course of the hijacking for reasons of operational or me-
chanical deficiencies unrelated to the hijacking. The fact that any
of these events may take place during the course of a hijacking
may not determine the liability of the airline since such events are
normally recognized risks of the air which, under the circumstances,
may not have been increased by the hijacking. In these cases, the
liability of the airline may be determined without regard to the
fact that the injury was sustained during the course of the hijack-
ing. In some instances, however, the airline may not be held
responsible for the same degree of care because of the pressures
inflicted on the airline personnel due to the hijacking.
Under some circumstances, a hijacking can increase the normally
recognized risks of the air; for example, when the aircraft is
forced, either by the hijackers, fuel shortages, or other considera-
tions, to land at an inadequate airfield. In these circumstances, the
questions of causation, foreseeability, and whether the hijacking
was the result of the airline's negligence undoubtedly will arise.
With regard to foreseeability, it may be determined that criminal
acts of hijackers in the course of and in furtherance of the hijack-
ing are intervening factors for which an airline will not be civilly
responsible, even though these acts result in the death or injury of
passengers. On the other hand, it may be determined that an airline
should be held to be the legal insurer of the safety of its passengers
in any hijacking situation. Since the airline is in a better position
to prevent a hijacking, the courts may conclude that an airline
should be responsible for whatever happens to a passenger once a
hijacking commences and until he is delivered safely to his original
destination.
A brief word on the subject of delay in transportation. Every
" See cases cited note 9 supra.
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hijacking inherently involves some delay in the completion of a
passenger's journey. Domestic airlines, however, are able to avoid
or limit liability for delay in accordance with tariffs filed with and
approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board.' There is no reason to
believe that tariff provisions of this nature will not apply equally
to hijacking cases.
B. The International Liability Rules
These rules are encompassed within the Warsaw Convention of
1929 and the 1966 Intercarrier Agreement, generally referred to
as the Montreal Agreement." The hijacking litigation existing
today involves the application of these rules to specific cases of
alleged passenger injuries. This litigation arises out of the hijack-
ings of September 6, 1970, to the Jordanian Desert and Cairo.
As previously stated, the liability rules in the Warsaw Conven-
tion apply to "international transportation" as defined in the Con-
vention. The special 1966 Intercarrier Agreement rules apply to a
particular type of Warsaw Convention international transporta-
tion, namely, that which involves a point of origin, point of desti-
nation, or agreed stopping place in the United States.2
The principal liability provision of the Warsaw Convention relat-
ing to passengers is Article 17, which provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.2
The requisites for airline liability under the Warsaw Convention,
therefore, are: (i) that there be an accident, and (ii) that it take
place on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or dis-
embarking. In such circumstances, Article 17 creates presumptive
liability on the part of the airline for the damage sustained because
"0 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970). But see Warsaw
Convention, article 19, dealing with the carrier's liability for delay in international
transportation.
11CAB Agreement No. 18900, approved in Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966).
Throughout, this Agreement will be referred to as the 1966 Intercarrier Agree-
ment.
21 Id.
11 Warsaw Convention, article 17.
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of the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger."
It is important to note, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated
in the case of MacDonald v. Air Canada,"4 that an accident is the
first requisite for invocation of this presumptive liability on the
part of the airline.
Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the pre-
sumptive liability created by Article 17 can be overcome upon
proof by the carrier that it took "all necessary measures" to avoid
the damage alleged or that it was impossible to do so.' These
defenses are waived by participating airlines in cases to which the
1966 Intercarrier Agreement applies, but only in respect of death,
wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger."
Article 19 creates presumptive liability for damage occasioned
by delay in the transportation of passengers." The Article 20(1)
defenses are not waived in the 1966 Intercarrier Agreement with
respect to Article 19 liability. 8 This provision has not been the
subject of a great deal of litigation, even in respect to hijacking
cases.
The Warsaw Convention limits the liability of the airline, absent
willful misconduct within the meaning of Article 25, as follows:
(i) In cases governed by the 1929 unamended Warsaw Con-
vention to approximately $9,000, but perhaps now about $10,000
because of the recent further devaluation of the dollar."'
(ii) In cases governed by the 1929 Warsaw Convention as
amended by the 1955 Hague Protocol, to approximately $18,000,
although again because of the recent devaluation this may be
about $20,000.0
(iii) In cases to which the 1966 Intercarrier Agreement ap-
plies, to $75,000."
2'MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971); Berguido v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
996 (1968); Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
"MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (Ist Cir. 1971).
'Warsaw Convention, article 20(1); Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227
F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
" CAB Agreement No. 18900, approved in Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966).
217 Warsaw Convention, article 19.
28 CAB Agreement No. 18900, approved in Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966).
"Warsaw Convention, article 22; CAB Order 72-6-7 (June 2, 1972).
"1S. EXEC. Doc. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. ExEc. REPT. No. 3,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); CAB Order 72-6-7 (June 2, 1972).
1 CAB Agreement No. 18900, approved in Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966).
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It must be remembered that the 1966 Intercarrier Agreement
is not a treaty. It is not a treaty amendment. It does not constitute
an amendment of the Warsaw Convention. The 1966 Intercarrier
Agreement is simply an airline agreement whereby participating
carriers have agreed, with respect to Warsaw Convention inter-
national transportation involving a point of origin, destination, or
an agreed stopping place in the United States:
(i) That the limit of liability for each passenger for death,
wounding or other bodily injury shall be the sum of $75,000; and
(ii) That article 20(1) defenses, with respect to any claim
arising out of the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a
passenger, are waived."
Even in cases to which the 1966 Intercarrier Agreeement ap-
plies, the basic requisites for an airline's liability are still the same.
There must be an accident, and it must take place on board the
aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking."
This is a summary of the liability rules applicable to inter-
national transportation as defined in the Warsaw Convention. The
hijackings of September 6, 1970, have led to a number of claims
against the carriers involved. Several suits were brought in New
York against TWA, Swissair, and Pan American. ' The Warsaw
Convention-1966 Intercarrier Agreement rules appear to have
been applicable to all of these claims. A number of the Pan Amer-
ican passengers sustained injuries in evacuating the 747 at Cairo.
The hijackers had allowed approximately eight minutes for the
completion of the landing and evacuation of the passengers before
the aircraft was destroyed by preset explosive charges located
throughout the aircraft. Although the passengers who were injured
left the aircraft by the emergency exits, it appears correct to con-
clude that their injuries were sustained as a result of an accident
to them in the course of disembarking the aircraft. Thus recovery
has been allowed in the Pan American cases for the physical in-
juries sustained in the course of evacuating the aircraft.' This
result seems consistent with the Warsaw Convention-1966 Inter-
a2Id.
" MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
"4 See cases cited note 6 supra.
'Salmon v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Index 096917, Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County, March 16, 1971.
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carrier Agreement liability rules. It would not appear to be sig-
nificant where the disembarking takes place, that is at the terminal
of a normally concluded flight or via an emergency exit at any
place to which the aircraft has been diverted as the result of a
hijacking, as in the Pan American cases.
Similarly, if a passenger sustains an accident on board the air-
craft in the course of the hijacking, liability for the physical injury
would appear to be clear under the Warsaw Convention-1966
Intercarrier Agreement rules subject, of course, to the contributory
negligence defense of Article 21. If the aircraft itself is involved
in an accident, even during the course of a hijacking, these rules
would appear to impose liability for any passenger personal injury
or death, subject, of course, to the applicable limit of liability.
Some interesting legal questions have arisen in a number of
cases brought against TWA and Swissair arising out of the Sep-
tember 6, 1970, hijackings. In these particular cases, no claim is
made for physical personal injury. Plaintiffs are claiming damages
for psychic injuries such as fright, depression, loss of weight, sleep-
lessness, nightmares, dermatitis, mental pain, anguish, and the
like." It appears that in each of these cases no plaintiff sustained
bodily contact injury or an accident of any kind involving his or
her person.
The passengers were held in the desert for a number of days
by the hijackers and their compatriots and, subsequently, in hotels
in Amman, Jordan, before ultimately being allowed to resume
their journey. The claims made are really for the scare and fright
that these passengers experienced during the course of the hijack-
ing and until they were safely on their way after being released
in Jordan.
The basic issue confronting the courts is whether the airlines
involved are liable under the Warsaw Convention-1966 Inter-
carrier Agreement rules for the damages alleged to have been sus-
tained because of the frightening experience of the hijacking. The
36 Warsaw Convention, article 21.
3" Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), appeal docketed, No. 73-1501, 2d Cir. March 5, 1973; Raful v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 41 App. Div.2d 753, 341 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dept. 1973);
Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827
(2d Dept. 1972); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 963,
338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dept. 1972).
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defense of the cases has taken two distinct courses. In the TWA
cases, the defendant argues that fright without bodily contact in-
jury is not wounding or any other bodily injury within the meaning
of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and, therefore, TWA is
not liable for the alleged damages." In the Swissair cases, however,
the defendant argues that a hijacking alone is not an accident
within the meaning of Article 17, that the prime requisite for
Warsaw Convention-1966 Intercarrier Agreement liability, viz.,
the happening of an accident on board the aircraft or in the course
of embarking or disembarking, is therefore lacking and Swissair
is not liable for the alleged damages."
In the TWA cases, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
on the issue of liability, asserting that the Montreal Agreement
establishes absolute liability for provable damages up to the sum
of $75,000 per passenger. The trial court in each case granted the
motion, and the concluding paragraphs of the trial court's opinion
in the case of Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. exemplify
the rationale:
It is the court's opinion that, since the plaintiff's damage was
sustained both while on board the aircraft during flight (when the
hijacking commenced) and while physically still on board during
the subsequent week of detention in the desert (while the hijacking
was still in progress), the plaintiff has demonstrated compliance
with the provision of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention that
the accident (hijacking) which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft.
In the court's opinion the defendant has no defense to the lia-
bility imposed upon it under the Warsaw Convention, as modified
by the Montreal Agreement, to the extent of plaintiff's provable
damages for injuries resulting from the intentional tort committed
upon the person of the plaintiff when, while a passenger in flight
on board defendant's airplane, she was held in close confinement
by armed hijackers both while the plane was in flight and there-
after while the plane was grounded until she was released seven
days later after the hijackers had destroyed the airplane."0
SHerrnan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d
827 (2d Dept. 1972); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d
963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dept. 1972).
3 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), appeal docketed, No. 73-1501, 2d Cir., March 5, 1973.40 Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 642, 645 (Sup. Ct. Kings
Co. 1972), rev'd, 40 App. Div.2d 850 (2d Dept. 1972).
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The appellate courts in each of the TWA cases have concluded
that summary judgment should not have been granted. The orders
of the trial courts have been reversed and the motions for summary
judgment denied. The appellate courts have concluded that triable
issues of fact are presented involving the precise meaning of the
official French text of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and
whether the language of Article 17 permits recovery for men-
tal anguish or non-bodily contact injury." These cases are in the
process of further appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. It is
worth noting that the appellate courts have stated that the basis
for an airline's liability as set out in Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention was not in any manner affected by the 1966 Inter-
carrier Agreement since that Agreement merely increased the limit
of liability of participating carriers and deprived them of certain
Article 20 defenses. '
The leading Swissair hijacking case is pending in the Southern
District of New York. 3 The plaintiff in that case seeks to recover
damages for emotional distress during the course of the hijacking.
Again, there is no claim for any bodily contact or impact injury.
Swissair moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon the basis that there was no accident within the meaning
of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention which caused the alleged
injuries. The basic question raised by the motion to dismiss was
whether a hijacking standing alone is an accident within the mean-
ing of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The district court
denied the motion and held that "a hijacking is within the ambit
of the term 'accident', and sufficient to raise the presumption of
liability under the Warsaw Convention as modified" by the 1966
Intercarrier Agreement." The court went on to express the view,
sua sponte, that it had difficulty reading the Warsaw Convention
to permit recovery for mental anguish and suffering alone. '
The district court has certified the question of whether a hijack-
41 Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d
827 (2d Dept. 1972); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d
963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dept. 1972).
"See cases cited note 41 supra.
43 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), appeal docketed, No. 73-1501, 2d Cir., March 5, 1973.
4 id. at 702, 707.
4ld. at 707-08.
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ing is an accident within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to
the Interlocutory Appeals Act,"' and that court recently granted
Swissair's petition for leave to appeal."
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Guatemala Protocol
of 1971, which, if it comes into effect, would amend the Warsaw
Convention in several respects, does not contain the word "acci-
dent" in the new Article 17. The new Article 17 reads as follows:
The carrier is liable for damages sustained in case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event
which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
This amendment to Article 17 would seem to lend support to the
argument that the term accident in the original Article 17 was
intended to have a very restricted meaning.
On the subject of delay in transportation, there are no reported
cases resulting from a hijacking. It appears, however, that the air-
line would be liable under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention
for provable damage occasioned by delay. 9 The 1966 Intercarrier
Agreement does not apply to delay cases, however, and, accord-
ingly, the airline would have available to it the "all necessary mea-
sures" defenses of Article 20(1) in any delay case." Additionally,
the limit of liability applicable to a delay case would be the War-
saw Convention limit of approximately $9,000 as opposed to the
1966 Intercarrier Agreement limit of $75,000."
This is the current status of the civil litigation arising out of the
September 6, 1970, hijackings. It will be interesting to see how the
two distinct issues which have arisen will be resolved by the respec-
tive appeals courts. Eventually the questions may reach the United
States Supreme Court.
46 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
Appeal docketed, No. 73-1501, 2d Cir., March 5, 1973.
SICAO Doe. 9040- LC/167-2 at 189 (1972) (emphasis added).
9 Warsaw Convention, article 19.
5°Warsaw Convention, article 20; CAB Agreement No. 18900, approved in
Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966).
51Warsaw Convention, article 22; CAB Agreement No. 18900, approved in
Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966).
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II. INSURANCE
The subject of insurance against the risks of hijacking deserves
particular attention since hijacking has become such a common
risk. Treatment of the subject of insurance coverage for the risks
of a hijacking will be brief and will relate only to the situation as
it exists in the London market, since that is the one with which
the writer is most familiar. Any discussion of this subject requires
consideration of what is best described as war risk insurance and
the development of policy language over the past four years or so
to accommodate the relatively new element of aircraft hijacking
risks.
In the early years there was not a recognized market for aviation
war risk insurance as there was in the case of the marine market.
As a result, it was not uncommon for an airline which desired
war risk coverage to ask its all risk underwriters to delete all or
part of the standard war risk exclusion clause subject to an addi-
tional premium. As the demands for aviation insurance generally
increased, the aviation insurance market expanded and airlines
sought and obtained war risk coverage for certain areas of the
world. After World War II, in order to meet the increased demand
caused in part by the advent of more sophisticated aircraft, a
specialized market developed for aviation war risk insurance.
At the present time, war risk coverage for aircraft hulls and
legal liability is available, at a price, in the traditional war risk
market. In some instances, coverage can also be obtained from all
risk underwriters. This coverage may be limited in amount, how-
ever, in view of the very high values of modem jet aircraft and
the potential liabilities. Additionally, some underwriters in the
United States, Europe, and in other countries are not prepared to
underwrite war risk or, if they do, they are not prepared to under-
write war risk for airlines operating in high risk areas. This lack
of capacity in recent years has resulted in certain governments
accepting some part of the responsibility for war risk of their
national airlines in order to give some protection.
In the United States war risk insurance can also be provided
by the government. Title 13 of the Federal Aviation Act author-
izes the Secretary of Transportation to provide war risk insurance
,whenever it is determined by the Secretary that such insurance,
adequate for the needs of the air commerce of the United States,
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cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions in the
commercial market." Under this statutory authority war risk insur-
ance may be provided with respect to American registered aircraft
and foreign flag aircraft engaged in aircraft operations deemed by
the Secretary to be in the interests of the national defense or the
national economy of the United States." The last information on
the subject was that no war risk insurance was being made avail-
able by the Secretary for foreign flag aircraft.
Obtaining war risk insurance, however, is not always the ready
answer to an airline's problem of insuring itself against the risks
inherent in hijacking. Hijacking itself has never really been con-
sidered as a war loss. Nevertheless, as a result of a series of amend-
ments to the London market war risk exclusion clause, commenc-
ing in 1969, hijacking now appears as one of the separately ex-
cluded risks in the war risk exclusion clause presently in use in
the London market. This clause today is entitled: "WAR, HI-
JACKING AND OTHER PERILS EXCLUSION CLAUSE
(AVIATION).""
5249 U.S.C. 5 1532 (1970).
5349 U.S.C. § 1533 (1970).
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(A VIA TION)
This Policy does not cover claims caused by
(a) War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be de-
clared or not), civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, martial law,
military or usurped power or attempts at usurpation of power.
(b) Any hostile detonation of any weapon of war employing atomic or
nuclear fission and/or fusion or other like reaction or radio-active force
or matter.
(c) Strikes, riots, civil commotions or labour disturbances.
(d) Any act of one or more persons, whether or not agents of a sovereign
Power, for political or terrorist purposes and whether the loss or damage
resulting therefrom is accidental or intentional.
(e) Any malicious act or act of sabotage.
(f) Confiscation, nationalisation, seizure, restraint, detention, appropriation,
requisition for title or use by or under the order of any Government
(whether civil military or de facto) or public or local authority.
(g) Hi-jacking or any unlawful seizure or wrongful exercise of control of the
Aircraft or crew in flight (including any attempt at such seizure or con-
trol) made by any person or persons on board the Aircraft acting with-
out the consent of the Insured.
Furthermore this Policy does not cover claims arising whilst the Aircraft is out-
side the control of the Insured by reason of any of the above perils. The Aircraft
shall be deemed to have been restored to the control of the Insured on the safe
return of the Aircraft to the Insured at an airfield not excluded by the geographi-
cal limits of this Policy, and entirely suitable for the operation of the Aircraft
(such safe return shall require that the Aircraft be parked with engines shut down
and under no duress).
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The assured can still ask for any one or more of the separately
excluded risks to be deleted from the exclusion clause subject, of
course, to the payment of an additional premium. The deletion of
one or more risks contained in the war risk exclusion clause serves
to afford coverage for that particular risk in the all risk policy.
Those which the all risk underwriters are not prepared to delete
can then be insured by the war risk market if they are disposed
to do so. Recent amendments to this clause have been designed to
bring it more in line with the war risk market's insuring clause so
as to remove the legal distinctions between the all risk exclusions
and the war risk cover language.
What happens when an aircraft hull loss occurs? The airline
would normally present the claim to its all risk underwriter who
then has the burden of proving that the loss comes within one of
the exclusions of the policy, including a hijacking exclusion if
there is one. The airline, on the other hand, would have the burden
of proving that a particular loss falls within its war risk hijacking
cover if it has one.
When an airline has two policies, one covering all risks with
the standard war risk-hijacking exclusion clause, and another cov-
ering the precise risks excluded from the all risk policy, the only
question that should arise when an aircraft is lost is the question
of causation. Was the cause of the loss one of the risks excluded
by the all risk policy and thereby included in the war risk policy?
This question hopefully would be resolved between the two com-
peting groups of underwriters after the airline has been paid the
loss.
When the exclusionary language in the all risk policy is not
quite the same as the coverage in the war risk policy, serious
construction problems can arise. This can result in the airline not
receiving payment of its claim until the question of who should
pay has been decided in a court. Since 1970, the differences be-
tween the all risk policy war exclusion clause and the language
of the war risk cover have largely been ironed out in the London
market so that, hopefully, this problem should not arise in the
future. Causation should be the only question when a loss occurs
during the course or as the result of a hijacking. The airline should
not be required to wait for payment pending resolution of this
question of causation. An additional problem can develop, how-
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ever, when a government participates in the war risk cover, unless
the particular government is prepared to provide the same coverage
as the war risk policy or as excluded in the all risk policy. Other-
wise, a government guarantee may not be as extensive as the
normal war risk coverage.
Returning once again to the hijackings of September 6, 1970,
the destruction of the Pan American 747 resulted in serious cover-
age questions. As it has developed, Pan American is caught in
the middle of a dispute between competing sets of insurers as to
who should pay for the loss of the 747. The all risk underwriters
evidently have taken the position that the loss of the 747 was
caused by a war risk. The war risk underwriters, on the other
hand, evidently have taken the position that the cause of the loss
was a hijacking and not a war risk. The result is that Pan Ameri-
can has not yet been paid for the hull, and the question of who
should pay is the subject of a trial just recently concluded in the
federal court in New York in which Pan American has sued all
the underwriters including the United States government which
wrote a substantial part of the war risk cover. A decision in that
case has recently been rendered. The district court, in a lengthy
opinion, held that the Pan American loss falls within the all risk
policy."
Hopefully, the recent amendments to the war risk-hijacking
exclusion clause will eliminate problems such as that confronting
Pan American. An even stronger hope is that the necessity to re-
solve such problems will never arise again in that we shall not
again experience the destruction of a civil aircraft by terrorists or
criminal or political hijackers."
" Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 71 Civ.
1118 (filed Sept. 17, 1973). The author understands that this decision will be ap-
pealed.
" Unfortunately, as quite recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated,
the elimination of the incidence of political, terrorist, or criminal hijackings will
not render obsolete the question of war risk versus all risk coverage. As recently
as February 21, 1973, a Libyan airliner was shot down by the Israeli Air Force
over the Sinai Desert. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 8. The Pan American
747 loss case was tried to a court sitting without a jury and the court's decision
in this fascinating and important case should be studied. Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 71 Civ. 1118 (filed Sept. 17,
1973). The legal aftermath of the hijacking of aircraft has resulted in the emer-
gence of new and seemingly complex legal issues. Resolution of at least some of
these issues will be forthcoming shortly. I urge you to follow closely the progress
of the litigation discussed herein.
Notes
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Comments

